Nvidia downplays discovery of 32 banned B300 chips in China Telecom's network
Israeli security firm Lava identifies 32 export-restricted Nvidia Blackwell Ultra B300 GPUs within a major Chinese state-owned telecom provider, prompting Nvidia to describe the leakage as statistically insignificant.
By Madison Morris ·

Nvidia has attempted to minimize the impact of a recent security finding that identified 32 Blackwell Ultra B300 GPUs inside the network of China Telecom, a state-owned telecommunications provider. The Israeli security firm Lava claims to have located these high-performance chips, which are currently barred from export to China by U.S. regulations. The discovery raises persistent questions about how restricted hardware continues to enter the Chinese market despite strict export controls that limit sales to whitelisted buyers who agree not to resell to sanctioned parties.
Contextualizing the current leak, industry reports indicate that the smuggling of Nvidia hardware into China has been a recurring challenge. In 2025, it was estimated that Chinese entities smuggled approximately $1 billion worth of Nvidia AI chips over a three-month period. While the B200 model was the primary target at that time, distributors had already begun preparing for the release of the B300 series. The B300, announced in March 2025, offers significant performance advantages over its predecessor, including 50% more memory and increased FP4 compute capabilities, making it a highly sought-after asset for advanced AI workloads.
In response to the report, an Nvidia spokesperson did not deny the presence of the chips but characterized the incident as a minor anomaly. The company stated that government and media investigations have historically found diversion of controlled U.S. products to be less than 0.5% of total shipments. "A drop in the bucket compared to the ocean of domestic compute China already has," the spokesperson said, adding that with tens of millions of GPUs in service in approved countries, smuggling remains a non-factor blocked by bilateral government efforts.
The exact mechanism by which the B300 chips entered China Telecom’s infrastructure remains unclear, and Lava has not pinpointed their specific location within the network. However, the chips were identified using Nvidia’s own DCGM Exporter tool, a software utility used by data center operators to monitor server health. Although intended for internal use, this tool can sometimes be accessed from outside the data center and may not always require password authentication. Nvidia has confirmed it is developing a dedicated tool to help locate its chips, though it has not yet been released.
The urgency surrounding the B300 is underscored by recent legal actions in Taiwan. In August 2026, nine individuals were indicted for the illegal export of B300 GPUs to China, a move that followed Supermicro’s decision to fire several employees after an internal investigation. The smuggling operation allegedly involved Flying Tiget Tech, a Taiwanese server trading firm with whitelisted status for GPU purchases. This case highlights the complex channels through which restricted hardware moves, even as Nvidia’s older A100 servers see prices triple due to sustained demand.
Looking ahead, the discovery suggests that the enforcement of export controls remains a work in progress. As Nvidia continues to refine its tracking tools and governments tighten their oversight, the market for both new and legacy Nvidia silicon remains volatile. The incident serves as a reminder that despite regulatory frameworks, the global demand for AI computing power continues to drive innovative, and often illicit, methods of distribution.
Source: Tom's Hardware · original report published





